We empirically examine the fiscal convergence of the recent ten European Union (EU) members using the Maastricht fiscal convergence criteria. We test for absolute beta and sigma convergence of the new members in comparison to the Maastricht benchmarks as well as the EU15 figures, utilizing methodologies that allow for structural breaks. The results show poor fiscal performance in the European Union in general, suggesting that monetary unions do not necessarily encourage fiscal convergence for its members.
Introduction, Motivation, and Our Approach
In this paper, we study fiscal convergence in the enlarged European Union (EU). Our general measure of fiscal convergence is based on satisfying Maastricht fiscal criteria that require prudent fiscal behavior by the new members before their entry to the EMU. We examine the performance of the ten EU newcomers, as well as that of the Eurozone by using alternative measures of fiscal convergence by employing tests that allow for structural breaks. Our results suggest questionable fiscal convergence in the EU in general and large heterogeneity in convergence in particular.
Our study is motivated by the increasing attention fiscal performance in the EU has been receiving since the formulation of the convergence criteria under the Maastricht treaty in 1992.
1 Over the time, the two fiscal criteria limiting the deficit and debt ratios within a percentage of GDP have come under sharp scrutiny. Theoretical literature on fiscal convergence is scant. Based on a simple game theoretical framework where agents agree on the long-term goals, Onorante (2004) shows that fiscal constraints lead to implicit coordination characterized by lower deficits, low interest rates and controlled inflation. The model provides an argument for benefits of fiscal convergence for acceding country and the stability of the existing monetary union. In this respect, existing empirical literature on fiscal policy coordination in the EU countries provides support to theoretical benefits of fiscal convergence in large (e.g., Knot and de Haan, 1995; Sanz and Velázquez, 2003; Arestis, Khan, and Luintel, 2002; Faini, 2006; Afonso and Rault, 2007) .
There is also ample evidence that fiscal convergence is systematically associated with enhanced business cycle synchronization as it eliminates idiosyncratic fiscal shocks along with evidence that reduced primary fiscal deficits (or higher surpluses) increase the coherence of business cycles across countries (Darvas, Rose, and Szapáry, 2005; Artis, Fidrmuc, and Scharler, 2008) . It is argued that the increased business cycle coherence along with fiscal convergence makes countries within the region better candidates for a currency union (Darvas et al. 2005). 7 Given limited studies on fiscal convergence, in particular, for the new-EU states, and its importance for EU policymakers, we contribute to the literature by providing a comprehensive empirical study on fiscal convergence of the new EU members to not only the Maastricht benchmark but against that of EU15. We relate the fiscal convergence to the continuing large fiscal deficits can create inflationary pressures. Further arguments in the same spirit are voiced by De Grauwe and Schnabl (2004) . 6 Since the underlying idea in fiscal rules of the EU is debt sustainability, our paper is related to recent studies on debt sustainability of developed and developing countries (e.g., Uctum, Thurston and Uctum, 2006; Uctum and Wickens, 2000) , as well as fiscal sustainability in the EU15 in general (i.e., Afonso and Rault, 2007; Hughes Hallett and Lewis, 2007) . 7 Since both the Maastricht convergence criteria and the Stability and Growth Act require prudent fiscal behavior before entry to the EMU, they indirectly move EU closer to an optimum currency area in the sense of Mundell (1961) . Korhonen (2003 and 2006) show that at least some new members have already achieved a sufficient degree of business cycle synchronization. One of the ways to test for the fiscal convergence of the new members towards the EU is to compare their distance from convergence criteria as set in the Maastricht Treaty:
(1) fiscal deficit up to 3% of GDP and (2) national debt up to 60% of GDP. In this respect we do not dispute or discuss the choice of the two ratio-values. Instead we complement the previous criteria with an alternative way of measuring the fiscal convergence in the EU newcomers with respect to the two synthetic benchmarks: (1) the EU core represented by Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands, and (2) the EU periphery represented by Greece, Portugal, and Spain. This alternative measure of fiscal convergence 8 Until recently, the cross-sectional tests used in analyzing absolute convergence were criticized for overrejection of the null hypothesis of no convergence (Bernard and Durlauf 1996) , shifting the emphasis to conditional and stochastic convergence. However, the need to meet the EU criteria for full EMU membership has regenerated interest in absolute convergence. 9 See e.g. Dibooglu and Kutan (2001) , Kočenda (2005) , and Égert et al. (2006) . Further, it has to be recognized that the transition alone represented a massive structural shift by definition.
is in the spirit of the Stability and Growth Act since we test whether any of the new EU members have been performing like the old EU countries (EU15).
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In the next section, we introduce the methodology and in section 3 we describe our data. Empirical results are reported in Section 4. The last section concludes and provides some policy implications.
Methodology
The analysis of convergence has been an active as well as a challenging field of interest since the late 1980s. used to analyze β-convergence were criticized on the grounds of over-rejecting the null hypothesis of no convergence (Quah 1996, Bernard and Durlauf 1996) . These criticisms pushed researchers to apply time series (or panel data) methodologies to introduce a second dimension to β-convergence.
A new test introduced by Vogelsang (1998 Vogelsang ( , 1999 
where t y is the log difference of a variable from a benchmark, in our case for example, the budget deficit-to-GDP ratio of country i minus the Maastricht (or other) benchmark at time 10 For evidence on considerable monetary convergence within new EU members, see Kočenda (2001) , Yigit (2004, 2005) . Brada et al. (2005) and Kutan and Yigit (2007) provide evidence on real convergence within new EU members and recent EU members, respectively. 11 For recent discussions, see Taylor (1999) and de la Fuente (2002) . 12 See Tomljanovich and Vogelsang (2002) for its application on US data.
t; μ is an intercept to capture the initial level of the deviation, t is a deterministic time trend, t x includes control variables if any, and u t is the residual term. In such a set-up, β-convergence requires that for countries where μ is initially significantly negative, so the country is lagging behind, the trend coefficient δ should have the opposite sign (positive) and be statistically significant. Carlino and Mills (1993) developed this test with a very restricted form of serial correlation for the residual term, namely AR(2). Vogelsang (1998) extended the analysis of this specification to with an unknown form of serial correlation, allowing for specifications ranging from integration of order zero, I(0), to order one, I(1).
Since the possibility of no convergence implies nonstationarity of the error terms, one can draw a false inference on the trend coefficient when the errors are assumed to be stationary AR(2). 14 It is defined as: 
In other words, J T is the Wald statistic that tests the joint hypothesis of . In
Monte Carlo simulations, Vogelsang (1998) above tests would be comparable and valid for every type of serial correlation form, including unit roots.
Despite the great flexibility of these tests in deriving the mean and trend coefficient estimates in time series with varying stationarity properties, one needs to be careful in using this methodology in the analysis of post-transition economies. The reason stems from the volatile nature of these economies and the presence of structural shifts that are documented in the empirical literature (e.g. Dibooglu and Kutan 2001; Kočenda, 2005; Égert et al., 2006) . We obtain robust results by using Vogelsang's (1999) methodology that allows for structural breaks in the modification of the statistics by including the possibility of shifts in the trend function. The test has been designed in two versions: one with predetermined breaks and the other with endogenous break selection. We favor the latter one. First, we estimate the break date using the optimal tests of Andrews and Ploberger (1994) . Then, using the estimated break date, normalized critical values are obtained using the following altered version of Equation (1 Uctum et al., 2006) .
Data and Sample Period
We assess fiscal convergence of the CEE8, Cyprus, and Malta using the official Maastricht criteria of the deficit-to-GDP and debt-to-GDP ratios. 17 We further examine fiscal convergence of these countries with respect to two naturally produced benchmarks. These 15 Sigma-convergence occurs when the cross-sectional standard deviation of a variable for a group of economies decrease in time. 16 The determination of the structural break date in Uctum et al (2006) and our paper is quite similar. 17 In terms of country coverage of the new EU member states, our paper is related to Hughes Hallett and Lewis (2007) , but their focus is on fiscal sustainability, rather than fiscal convergence. They study debt dynamics for the eight new members from Central and Eastern Europe that are part of our sample as well. ministries. 18 We also annualize the quarterly debt and deficit data by summing the four quarters and then using this sum to obtain the deficit-to-GDP and debt-to-GDP ratios. We should reiterate at this point that the serial correlation generated by the methodology used for de-seasonalizing the data is of little concern here since the Vogelsang test is able to handle broad forms of serial correlation.
Empirical Findings
The Vogelsang test results are displayed in Tables 1 through 2 
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The dependent variables in the analyses are the ratio of the budget deficit (surplus) to GDP and total debt to GDP in a new member country minus the benchmarks, 3% for deficit and 60% for total debt. Since all deficits (debt) are indicated by a negative number (e.g., minus 2% stands for two percent deficit), all mean values that are positive indicate surplus or deficit (debt) ratios below (less negative) 3% (60%), values that are zero indicate deficit (debt) of exactly 3% (60%), and values that are negative indicate deficit (debt) ratios greater than 3% (60%). As the GDP growth is used as a control variable accounting for cyclical deficit movements, we modify the test specification according to the choice of benchmark. While we use the country specific growth levels in the 3% benchmark regressions for instance, we prefer growth deviations for the core and periphery regressions.
19 Due to our small sample size, we run auxiliary Monte Carlo simulations to check the validity of the Vogelsang (2001) methodology. We run 5000 simulations with generated series with structural breaks (both in the mean and trend) to find that the methodology performs well in getting the true point estimates only with wider standard errors in comparison to the Vogelsang study. These simulations also show that the test performs well under 10% percent trimming even in small samples. Simulation results are available upon request.
Accordingly, negative trend coefficients depict deficit (debt) increases (or declining budget surpluses) with respect to the benchmark, suggesting fiscal divergence relative to the benchmark, and positive coefficients suggest just the opposite (fiscal convergence).
As a complementary measure of fiscal convergence, we also report the σ-convergence tests to be able to test whether the fiscal position of the new EU members are diverging or converging towards the core and periphery EU members. We illustrate the σ-convergence levels graphically. One should note that since the sigma (standard deviation in our case) is calculated cross-sectionally, the choice of benchmark does not alter the results.
Fiscal Convergence: Budget Deficit results
Table 1 examines whether the mean and trend coefficients of Equation (4) convergence. The pattern that emerges from the table in general is that the earlier lack of fiscal convergence subsides as membership gets closer and that the countries with higher level of non-convergence tend to perform with more discipline than the ones with low deficits (better convergence).
The deficit-to-GDP ratio with respect to the benchmark of the core shows in essence a confirmation of the 3% benchmark (Table 1) Mean ratio of the newcomers shows no improvement (or decline) with a flat trend during the period under research. The old members seem to be converging to a higher than desired equilibrium. From this perspective, convergence of the newcomers in terms of deficit-to-GDP ratio towards either the core or the periphery looks like a dubious enterprise, confirming the necessity of EDP.
Fiscal Convergence: Debt results
Convergence of the general government debt-to-GDP ratio towards the Maastricht benchmark of 60% as well as towards the core and periphery is displayed in Table 2 and Figure 2 , in a similar fashion as with the budget deficit. The key dependent variable in Table 2 is the consolidated debt-to-GDP ratio in a new member country minus the 60% benchmark. A positive number indicates a debt ratio below 60% since the negative 60% benchmark subtracted from a less negative debt ratio yields positive values; thus, for example, a mean value of 40 means a 20% debt-to-GDP ratio. All countries, except 
Conclusions and Policy Implications
Our study examines the fiscal convergence of the new EU members with respect to EU15.
Employing alternative measures of fiscal convergence and vastly flexible tests of convergence that allow for structural breaks, our study provides enhanced inference on fiscal convergence. An important finding that emerges from our study is that there exists a significant level of heterogeneity in fiscal convergence, raising concerns about the ability of monetary unions to provide fiscal convergence for its members. Given limited sample size, our results should be interpreted cautiously.
An important implication of our results is that the ongoing reform of the public finance systems in the whole EU27 is an agenda that is timely and should not to be underestimated. In the new EU members, this issue becomes even more important, because a neglect of public finance reforms and lack of fiscal convergence could lead to endangering completion of the Maastricht criteria and the consideration of entry into the Eurozone.
Our findings suggest the need to design further policies to improve fiscal performance. For example, EU policymakers may consider adopting fiscal policy rules, rather than a counter-cyclical fiscal policy. Some countries, such as Poland and the Netherlands, have already introduced fiscal rules into the laws and constitutions (Tanzi, 2005) . Of course, the fact that the member states have different fiscal positions certainly creates implementation problems, at east initially. Tanzi suggests that "flexibility is required as to the time needed to conform to the rule, but the rule should not be relaxed to the point of making sinning more acceptable for everyone" (p. 63). Note: The first dependent variable is the budget deficit (surplus) to GDP ratio in country i minus the 3% deficit benchmark (a positive number indicates a surplus or a deficit ratio below 3% since the negative 3% benchmark subtracted from a less negative deficit ratio yields positive values). For the core (periphery), it is the deficit to GDP ratio in country i minus the core (periphery) deficit ratio (hence a negative number indicates a deficit ratio worse than that of the core (periphery) and a positive trend indicates lowering comparative deficit ratios). Hence, a positive trend coefficient indicates improving comparative fiscal stance. GDP growth (differences when necessary) has been used to control for cyclicality. The numbers in the parentheses for the above 
